4.2.1. Anonymity & accountability: who flagged my video?
Control is introduced into the relationship between the entity of YouTube and the user at the very beginning, when the user is asked to self-identify by logging-in. While this action is not required, it is rewarded by an architectural design that privileges those who do log in; providing them access to production tools, giving them individual channels, and the ability to rate other members’ work. (Rassi, 2007)
In chapter 2, I already mentioned the fact that ‘flagging’ is one of the most invisible options in the sense of not traceable back to a specific user (‘sharing’ being the other). Although this is the case for the rest of the community, it does not apply to the company. YouTube knows which user flags, which video is flagged and why it was flagged; this is not surprising and even stated in YouTube’s Privacy Notice:
“If you submit personally identifiable information to us through the YouTube Sites, we use your personal information to operate, maintain and provide to you the general and personalised features and functionality of the YouTube Sites and to process any flagging activity or correspondence you send to us.”
In the lawsuit between Google and Viacom, US court ruled in July of 2008 that Google must divulge the viewing habits of every user who has ever watched any video on YouTube by handing over the viewing logs of YouTube to Viacom. These contains the log-in ID of users, the computer IP address (online identifier) and video clip details.
This shows that it isn’t that anonymous to begin with. Its functionality in respect to flagging is not that it provides anonymity towards the company, but towards the community instead. The benefit of this is that a user can flag a video without having to worry about other users ‘getting back at them or other types of reprisals. In that sense the system now works similar to the Dutch telephone service Meld Misdaad Anoniem (Report Crime Anonymously), the so-called ‘kliklijn’ in the vernacular, provided by Stichting M. Civilians can call this service to anonymously report crimes. The service has proved to be effective. Which leads to the conclusion that when offered the option to report anonymously, more people will do so.
Stichting M is part of Crime Stoppers International Foundation, which is an umbrella organization for similar programs around the world. One difference however is that Stichting M does not work with rewards, in contrast to the Crimestopper’s program.
Meld Misdaad Anoniem works more discrete than YouTube, because it does not hold any records on its callers. Securing the anonymity of their callers is their main priority, even higher than the quality of the report. They don’t see the telephone number, don’t tape the conversation, don’t make notes of personal details, other notes are destroyed after transferring the report and the number doesn’t show on telephone bills. Which makes the previous described scenario between Viacom and YouTube impossible to happen to Stichting M.
Another similar service is the Kindertelefoon, a telephone service for children. They can call anonymously when they’re experiencing problems of any kind. This service is secured in the law of childcare and has been around since 1975. This service is only partly to report crime and is mostly used for more personal problems. But again, anonymity has a high priority when using the service. All noted data is anonymous and cannot be traced back to specific children or youngsters. The Kindertelefoon works in accordance with the law of Protection of Personal Data .
The benefits of anonymity implied by these two services can be summed up in the words ‘control’ and ‘safety’:
- You are in control.
• Kindertelefoon: “We will only bring you in contact with Childcare if you give your permission.”
• Kindertelefoon: “ We will never come to you and will not contact you. You are the one that calls or chats.”
• Stichting M: “the phone number of M. does not appear on the phone bill.”
- You are safe.
• Kindertelefoon: “We never tell something to others.”
• Kindertelefoon: “All employees have confidentiality obligations.”
• Stichting M: “When the caller has information that leads directly to him? In that case the operator will discuss this and M. does not make a report.”
• Stichting M: “ We don’t make records of personal details and other records of any kind are destroyed after the report is transferred.”
These benefits can be translated into “You cannot be held accountable” or responsible if you will. Which in these two cases (crime and childcare) is understandable and defendable for the offline world. But anonymity in other contexts can also bring forth other (unwanted) consequences, for example the high rate of hate speech and spam in YouTube comments.
“It’s called John Gabriel’s Greater Internet Fuckwad Theory,” says Clay Shirky, a journalist and New York University adjunct professor who studies the social and economic effects of Internet technologies. The theory is based on this simple equation: Normal Person + Audience + Anonymity = Fuckwad.
“There’s a large crowd,” says Shirky, “and you can act out in front of it without paying any personal price to your reputation,” which creates conditions most likely to draw out the typical Internet user’s worst impulses. The Fuckwad theory is the modern-day equivalent of the dilemma described by the late ecologist Garrett Hardin in his 1968 essay “Tragedy of the Commons”: How do you manage a communal resource when everyone who uses it has an interest in sustaining it but also the opportunity and the incentive to abuse it?
It would seem that if one would take out ‘Anonymity’ from this equation, the problem would be solved. But the issue of both this so-called ‘Fuckwad Theory’ and the Tragedy of the Commons is the fact that no one can be held accountable for the consequences. I am of the opinion that accountability towards the online community is a good thing. This does not necessarily mean connecting the offline identity with online identity and exposing someone. But extending the online identity with a reputation, which in turn can be held accountable. Because the anonymity of an online identity can also have its benefits:
“Anonymity plus physical distance plus rare & ephemeral dialogue enable for this type of hatred as public performance. But it also allows people to feel really relaxed and to have this freedom to experience humanity without fear or (social) anxiety.” (Wesch, 2008)
Whether or not staying anonymous, it will remain the choice of the user to perform their identity with, according to Particia G. Lange, a ‘publicly private’ behavior or a ‘privately public’ behavior. The user’s true identity can still be kept from the community by assuming a nickname for instance. And this nickname is shown when performing all kind of user actions, such as commenting, subscribing etc. Only sharing and flagging are quite hard to trace back. And all options have in common that they have a low barrier to be used, they require a mere push on the button to perform the action. While the (collective) consequences of these actions are quite visible, as we saw in chapter 1. The combination of not being held accountable and the ease with which the action is performed with, leads me to think that these are the two main incentives for misuse of the flagging system. Making user accounts accountable for their actions to the community would decrease the amount of flagging in general and especially decrease the amount of unjustified flagging. I will elaborate on how this should/could work in chapter 7 ‘My proposal for a reputation system amongst the YouTube user accounts.’